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Conditional Parentage is the New Eugenics 
 
Dr. Yael Efron & Dr. Pnina Lifshitz-Aviram 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Should states allow people to condition their parentage upon 
the traits of their prospective child? Is it legitimate for parents to 
aspire to an improved offspring, or should eugenic practices be 
restrained? Despite its reputation and the negative moral value 
attributed to eugenics,1 we argue in this paper that parental selection 
practices are growing in scope and abundance2 and are eugenics de 
facto. We further claim that, in considering this reality, the practices 
of genetic selection should be evaluated just as other forms of 
parental and reproductive autonomy are discussed: based on their 
reasons and justifications, rather than on terminology. 
We examine the growing practice of eugenics as a fast-
developing aspect of a legal phenomenon we call ‘conditional 
parentage’.3 We use this term to describe the choice given to, or 
desired by, prospective parents to decide whether they wish to 
parent a specific child or fetus. In this paper we claim that, unlike 
eugenics, conditional parentage is well-accepted in modern 
societies, as well as in several legal systems, such as France, 
England, and Israel. We wish to contribute to the existing literature 
on parental selection a new conceptualization for eugenics. We 
claim that when considered as a form of conditional parentage, 
eugenics has gained popularity in the obstetrics field and serve 
justifiable ends. We urge policymakers to embrace this new concept 
                                                                                                                                        
 Dr. Pnina Lifshitz-Aviram is a Lecturer of Law and Bio-Ethics, Zefat 
Academic College; author of the books INFORMED CONSENT OF MINORS (2006) 
(Heb.) and DELICATE BALANCE (2016) (Heb.). Dr. Yael Efron is Vice Dean of 
Zefat College School of Law, an expert in legal education and alternative 
dispute resolution and teaches Family Law. 
1Stephen Wilkinson, Eugenics, Embryo Selection and the Equal Value Principle 
1 CLINICAL ETHICS 46, 50 (2006). 
2Rosamund Scott, Choosing Between Possible Lives: Law and Ethics of 
Prenatal and Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis 1 (2007). 
3The term conditional parentage differs from the psychologic term ‘conditional 
parenting’, as explained hereafter. 
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when considering whether and how to restrict the parental choice of 
parentage, rather than reject it altogether based on a dated concept 
of eugenics. We call on them to acknowledge and regulate 
conditional parentage. 
To demonstrate our claim, we compare three practices of 
parental selection, which we consider falling under the umbrella of 
‘conditional parentage’. All three are examples of states’ policies for 
approval, endorsement, and even encouragement for prospective 
parents to condition their parentage upon the traits of a specific child 
or fetus. We show this in adoption, abortion and preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis (PGD). We focus on three jurisdictions that share 
a common history of resentment towards eugenics: England, where 
the term was first introduced; Europe, where less than a century ago, 
horrific acts were performed under a misconceived notion of 
eugenics; and Israel, whose inhabitants are still haunted by Nazi 
eugenic practices. 
The term “eugenics,” coined by Sir Francis Galton,4 combines 
two Greek words: GEN (source or root) and EUS (good or fitting). 
Thus, suggesting the improvement of offspring. Galton was devoted 
to propagating the idea of improving the physical and mental 
makeup of the human species via selective parenthood.5 The term 
eugenics refers to both positive and negative eugenics.6 Positive 
eugenics encourage the birth of newborns with what are considered 
positive character traits with the aim to “promote” successful 
populations.7 Negative eugenics aims at preventing the increase of 
problematic populations, inter alia, by minimizing procreation of 
people considered to have negative characteristics, and in extreme 
cases by killing the sick and disabled. It was based on these theories, 
that horrific interventions in human reproduction were carried out 
throughout history, some of which will be reviewed hereafter. 
                                                                                                                                        
4Francis Galton, Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its Development 24 (1883). 
5Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, Sir Francis Galton, Encyclopedia 
Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Francis-Galton (last visited 
July 12, 2019). 
6Some distinguish therapeutic goods of genetic engineering, aimed at curing 
diseases (what we refer to as negative eugenics) from eugenic goods of genetic 
engineering, aimed at enhancing capabilities (what we refer to as positive 
eugenics). See Nicholas Agar, Liberal Eugenics, 12(2) PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
QUARTERLY 137, 141 (1998). 
7An experiment designed to fertilize upper-class women with sperm from Nobel 
prize winners ended with disappointing results and is described in DAVID PLOTZ, 
THE GENIUS FACTORY: THE CURIOUS HISTORY OF THE NOBEL PRIZE SPERM 
BANK (2005). 
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Having established the prominence of parental selection 
practices, this paper admits that even states that allow for various 
forms of eugenics, although not named as such, make a strong 
argument for regulating them. The use of eugenics as conditional 
parentage could be justified both on a personal-interest level, as well 
as on a state-interest level. State regulation, however, has two facets. 
On the one hand, it is necessary to prevent the dangerous use of such 
medical and social practices.  On the other, state intervention in 
reproduction had been the root of historical abuse of science, and 
should therefore be limited. The contribution of this paper to 
existing literature is the comparison between the interests that 
governed eugenic in the past to those that inform regulation today. 
Today, paternalistic regulation binds parent’s autonomous choice to 
opt for selection. Whereas past regulation was coercive and 
paternalistic in its attempt to force eugenic practices on prospective 
parents. In this regard, we oppose the notion that the distinguishing 
mark of the new liberal eugenics is state neutrality.8 
The shift in state concerns requires a new perception of 
eugenics. Respecting parents’ autonomy calls for a different 
perspective on the regulation of eugenic practices. In this paper, we 
call for the acknowledgement of modern eugenics as a form of 
conditional parentage, and that it should, therefore, be regulated in 
a cautious manner, rather than banned altogether. We suggest that 
current regulation of such practices, previously considered 
paternalistic, are in fact a recognition of parents’ autonomy to 
choose their prospective offspring. In this paper, we offer 
suggestions for regulatory guidelines that might be adopted. 
In the next section of this paper, we describe eugenics as a 
socio-medical phenomenon, evolving over time and yielding to 
regulatory frameworks. We then introduce conditional parentage as 
a legal phenomenon, demonstrated by several practices of selective 
parentage. In the last chapter we provide suggested guidelines for 
regulating eugenics in attempt to balance respect of parental choice 
with other paternalistic considerations. 
 
II. EUGENICS AS A SOCIO-MEDICAL 
PHENOMENON 
 
In this section, we define and describe eugenics, and discuss its 
socio-medical development. We also recognize the need for 
                                                                                                                                        
8Agar, Supra note 6, at 137. 
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regulating eugenics and detail some forms of its regulation. 
Eugenics are described as “the science of improving human stock.”9 
The medical definition has long evolved into a philosophy, which is 
widely condemned today. The philosophy justifies the prevention of 
procreation of certain populations. We argue that the horrific turn of 
events skewed the legitimate aim of eugenics, which is to minimize 
pain and hardships to individuals and communities. We argue that 
justifiable aims, regulated and monitored, do not necessarily lead to 
evil deeds. We do, however, recognize that scientific developments 
may be the catalyst for amendments in eugenic regulation. 
 
A. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENTS OF EUGENICS 
 
The concept of improving a population by controlled breeding, 
in order to increase the occurrence of socially desirable 
characteristics thought to be hereditary originated from Francis 
Galton’s idea on marriage. Galton believed a system of arranged 
marriages between men of distinction and women of wealth that 
would eventually produce a gifted race.10 Galton’s ideas of positive 
selection were embraced by a eugenics movement, founded in 1904. 
At the heart of the eugenics movement lay certain social and 
scientific assumptions. One such assumption was that certain 
characteristics and traits were thought to be hereditary. The 
characteristics viewed as almost exclusively hereditary were mental 
retardation, mental illness, criminality, prostitution, sexual 
perversion and other types of immoral behavior. 11  These 
assumptions led the movement to advocate for negative eugenics 
(discouraging and decreasing procreation by individuals and groups 
who were viewed as having inferior or undesirable traits), even more 
than for positive eugenics (encouragement of procreation by 
individuals and groups who were viewed as possessing desirable 
characteristics and genes).12 
                                                                                                                                        
9Id. 
10Francis Galton, Hereditary Genius (1869). 
11Science today renounces this notion, of course. Investigators who thought to 
trace the gene for idleness or criminality that they found in the same family for 
generations concluded that such traits result from complex interactions of genes 
and environment. Kim Sterelny & Philip Kitcher, The Return of the Gene, 85(7) 
JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 339 (1988). 
12An example for such regulatory initiative, outside the scope of our studied 
jurisdictions, can be found in the LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA 
(1979). 
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The movement was also concerned that families with 
“defective” offspring were a financial burden on the state and 
estimated that the “civilized world” spends about five billion dollars 
caring for mental defectives in public institutions.13  However, the 
economic argument was secondary to the primary concern of 
preventing the social delinquency and crime which was attributed to 
mental retardation and other assumed inherited conditions. Henry 
Goddard, a leading specialist in delinquency in the United States at 
the beginning of the 20th century, emphasized the correlation 
between mental retardation and crime. He coined the term “moron” 
and viewed the mentally weak as a menace to society and 
civilization and as playing a large role for most social problems.14 
Under these eugenic ‘scientific’ assumptions, horrific deeds 
were performed worldwide under the auspices of the law. It was 
based on eugenics that the Nazi concept of “a pure race” emerged 
too. In 1933, shortly after Hitler’s rise to power, legislation was 
passed that made it compulsory to undergo sterilization and 
termination of pregnancy based on eugenics. 15  Sterilization was 
forced upon people with mental illness, learning disabilities, 
physical deformities, epilepsy, blindness, deafness and alcoholism. 
Initiated by Heinrich Himmler, the Nazi state forced motherhood on 
Aryan women under the eugenics plan known as Lebensborn. 
According to this plan, women of upper-class status were 
imprisoned in a mating farm and forced to copulate with SS officers 
to produce a special  
“titanic” generation.16 
The Nazi abuse of eugenics brought about harsh criticism and 
these “scientific” assumptions were finally discredited. Sterilization 
laws influenced by this distorted theory, were enacted in many states 
outside of Europe and held firm for many decades to follow. In fact, 
instances of involuntary sterilization under the auspices of the law 
continued worldwide well into the 1970’s. For example, by 1965, 
about one-third of all Puerto Rican women of child-bearing age 
                                                                                                                                        
13Ezra Seymour Gosney & Paul Popenoe, Sterilization for Human Betterment 
viii (1929). 
14HENRY GODDARD, FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS: AN INQUIRY INTO ITS NATURE AND 
CONSEQUENCES (1914). 
15Gisela Bock, Racism and Sexism in Nazi Germany: Motherhood, Compulsory 
Sterilization, and the State, When Biology became Destiny: Women in Weimar 
and Nazi Germany 400, 407 (1984). 
16PATRIZIA ALBANESE, MOTHERS OF THE NATION: WOMEN, FAMILIES AND 
NATIONALISM IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY EUROPE 37 (2006). 
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underwent sterilization under the local legal regime. 17  Between 
1975 and 1977, India had approximately seven million people 
sterilized in a nineteen-month period, under a governmental 
sterilization program led by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.18 Even 
in Canada, the Sexual Sterilization Act, allowing involuntary 
sterilization under certain conditions, was only repealed in 1972.19 
 
B. REGULATION OF EUGENICS 
 
Whether socially and legally accepted, or criticized and 
condemned, practices of eugenics have always been regulated. 
When regulating the different forms of eugenics, three sets of 
concerns could be regarded. The first and most prominent concern 
in the historic eugenic movement was the concern for the 
community. The desire for a homogenic group, the fear of unsettling 
a balance that would inflict discomfort to the dominant group and 
the concern for the economic burden entailed in resorting this 
balance were the drivers for the legal framework regulating 
eugenics.20  The second set of concerns involves the prospective 
parents. These include their desire for autonomous decision-making 
about their lives, their emotional well-being and their financial 
burden. The last set of concerns has to do with the unborn child. 
These concerns involve the medical, religious, legal and ethical 
viewpoint regarding the “life” of a fetus. But, since the last set of 
concerns goes beyond the scope of this argument, we wish to focus 
on concerns of the future care and well-being of the offspring once 
it is born. 
The concern for the community had been the main driver of the 
eugenic movement in the past.21  Sterilization of the mentally or 
                                                                                                                                        
17A law regulating “eugenic sterilization” was enacted in Puerto Rico (Act 
number 116 of May 13, 1937) and was not repealed until June 8, 1960. See 
Bonnie Mass, Puerto Rico: A Case Study of Population Control, 4(4) LAT. AM. 
PERSPECT. 66 (1977). 
18IAN ROBERT DOWBIGGIN, THE STERILIZATION MOVEMENT AND GLOBAL 
FERTILITY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 121-122 (2008). 
19Sexual Sterilization Repeal Act c. 87 (1972). 
20Describes how politicians and scientists portrayed society as an organic body 
that had to be guided by biological laws: “Eugenics promoted a biologizing 
vision of society in which the reproductive rights of individuals were 
subordinated to the rights of an abstract organic collectivity” Frank Dikötter, 
Race culture: Recent Perspectives on the History of Eugenics, 103(2) AM. HIST. 
REV. 467, 468 (1998). 
21Daniel Wikler, Can We Learn From Eugenics? 25 J. MED. ETHICS 183, 193 
(1999). 
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physically impaired was considered to be akin to vaccination. 
Justice Holmes of the United States Supreme Court explained this 
rationale in 1927: 
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call 
upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could 
not call upon those who already sap the strength of the State for these 
lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in 
order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better 
for all the world if, instead of waiting to execute degenerate 
offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society 
can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their 
kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad 
enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.22 
The laws that regulated eugenics, in many places in the world, 
followed the same reasoning. It was considered a public good to 
have a homogenic society, and the law was a justifiable means of 
creating one. As Holmes concluded, “The law does all that is needed 
when it does all that it can, indicates a policy, applies it to all within 
the lines, and seeks to bring within the lines all similarly situated so 
far and so fast as its means allow.”23 
What differentiates past regulation of eugenic practices from 
what we suggest in this paper is the fact that historic regulation was 
government-led and coercive. 24  The societal good is not an 
illegitimate goal, rather the general consensus in liberal societies 
today, as in many of their legal systems, is that the well-being of the 
group cannot champion individual rights without proper 
consideration. The question of moral importance is whether it can 
be done fairly and justly. As Wikler puts it: “[i]t wasn’t, the last time 
it was tried.”25 
One possible model for a state to promote communal 
considerations in a non-coercive way is by generously funding 
prenatal examinations to detect genetic disorders.26 In Israel, for 
                                                                                                                                        
22Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). 
23Id. at 208. 
24Jonathan Glover Et. Al., Eugenics: Some Lessons from the Nazi Experience 
THE FUTURE OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION: ETHICS, CHOICE AND REGULATION 55 
(1998). 
25Wikler, Supra note 21 at 193. 
26E.g., Avishalom Westreich ET. AL. Brill Research Perspectives in Family Law 
in a Global Society Assisted Reproduction in Israel: Law, Religion and Culture, 
1 2 (2018); Yehezkel Margalit, Determining Legal Parentage: Between Family 
Law and Contract Law - On Challenges Determination of Legal Parenthood in 
the Modern Era, 6 HAIFA L. REV. 553 (2012). 
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instance, there are no state-required procedures to ensure the birth 
of a healthy baby, but an extraordinary state budget is allocated to 
prenatal screening tests. As a result, most Israeli parents opt for these 
examinations. If a genetic defect is recognized, it is entirely up to 
the parents to decide how to act; there is no state intervention in the 
decision. However, societal pressure, created by the scarcity of 
impairment in the public sphere, leads many parents to terminate 
pregnancies of genetically impaired offspring. 27 
The concern for the prospective parents is the second set of 
concerns we wish to address when considering regulating eugenics. 
Under these, we can find parental autonomy, which will be further 
discussed hereafter; emotional concerns; and the financial burden 
involved in raising a child with special needs. In the past, it was 
these concerns that allowed state paternalism to justify negative 
eugenics. Today, courts and legislators are weighing parents’ rights 
and wishes against other interests. 28  We argue that parental-
interests have replaced the past community-interest driven eugenics. 
It is not the state that coerces parents to eliminate unwanted embryos 
or to avoid disabled offspring, rather it is the choice of many to 
parent a child with what they perceive to be the best genetic profile. 
Although not coerced anymore, such choice is endorsed by many 
states, by what King calls “laissez-faire eugenics.”29 
We turn now to the last set of concerns – that of the prospective 
offspring. We wish to distinguish this discussion on the well-being 
of the prospective child from the question of whether a fetus holds 
any rights or privileges before it is born. For the purpose of our 
argument, we wish to concede that for whatever reason the child was 
born, its conception was subject to eugenics. What we are interested 
in exploring, in this regard, is whether the prospective child’s well-
being was considered when the eugenic practice took place. 
                                                                                                                                        
27Edem E. Ekwo, Jae‐On Kim, Carol A. Gosselink, John M. Opitz, James F. 
Reynolds, Parental Perceptions of the Burden of Genetic Disease, 28(4) AM. J. 
MED. GENET. 955 (1987). 
28See, e.g, Lifchez v. Hartigan, 914 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that if the 
right to privacy includes the right to avoid reproduction, it should also include 
“the right to submit to a medical procedure that may bring about, rather than 
prevent, pregnancy”); Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 
(1992) (concurring many previous rulings that “the right of privacy includes the 
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters that so fundamentally affect a person as 
does the decision whether to bear or beget a child”). 
29David S. King, “Preimplantation Genetic diagnosis and the ‘New’ Eugenic” 
25 J. MED. ETHICS 176, 176 (1999). 
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When considering eugenic practices, courts and legislators 
examine the effect of the decision to birth the offspring on the 
quality of life the child would have. The debate over sibling savior 
selection, which will be discussed hereafter, is an example of such 
deliberation. Should parents have the right to choose an embryo that 
would carry specific genetic traits for the purpose of using these 
traits as a means for treating another child? Different legal systems 
would decide the dilemma differently, but nowadays, all would 
consider that prospective child’s well-being. 
To conclude this section, we wish to emphasize the difference 
between the role of eugenics in the first half of the twentieth century 
from what it is today. In the past, eugenic practices were utilized to 
“better society” and abused science to justify paternalistic rules that 
had overridden parental autonomy while ignoring considerations for 
the well-being of the prospective child. Today, eugenic practices 
make use of science to fulfil parental wishes and to improve the 
quality of life of their offspring. Current eugenics serve as a means 
for conditioning parentage, in the service of parents and their 
offspring as well as in the service of society as a whole. 
 
III. CONDITIONAL PARENTAGE AS A LEGAL 
PHENOMENON 
 
The term ‘conditional parentage’ refers to the choice given to, 
or desired by, prospective parents to decide whether they wish to 
parent a specific child or fetus. It is distinct from the term 
‘conditional parenting’ used in the realm of family psychology. The 
psychologist Carl Rogers was the first to argue that parents should 
love their children unconditionally, for who they are and not for 
what they do.30 Therapists have argued that conditional parenting 
can harm the child’s sense of self-worth and social development.31 
Despite the obvious linkage of the two terms, this paper does not 
deal with the psychological ramifications of loving children with or 
without conditions. We focus our argument on the legal frameworks 
that allow prospective parents’ preempted decision to become the 
                                                                                                                                        
30CARL ROGERS, CLIENT-CENTERED THERAPY: ITS CURRENT PRACTICE, 
IMPLICATIONS AND THEORY (1953). 
31ALFIE KOHN, UNCONDITIONAL PARENTING: MOVING FROM REWARDS AND 
PUNISHMENTS TO LOVE AND REASON (2005). 
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parents of a specific child or fetus, and not on how they choose to 
raise and educate them if they do become their parents.32 
 Many legal systems deem the right to parent a fundamental 
human right, thus protecting it against state intervention33 or the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, the prevention of disorder or crime, the 
protection of health or morals, or the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.34 The scope and limitations of these types of 
interventions are beyond the aim of this paper. We wish to focus on 
the legal questions that arise when discussing the symmetric right 
not to parent35 and the right (if this desire is indeed protected as 
such) to parent a child with or without specific traits. 
The narrow point of view of the positive right to be a parent, 
which suggests that the right to parent includes the right to choose 
offspring of certain characteristics, is morally debated. The moral 
                                                                                                                                        
32A similar differentiation is developed in STEPHEN WILKINSON, CHOOSING 
TOMORROW’S CHILDREN: THE ETHICS OF SELECTIVE REPRODUCTION (2010), 
chapter 2. Wilkinson argues that even if parents should love whatever attributes 
their child would have, it does not follow that it is wrong to select a child with 
specific attributes. Moreover, parents could aim at having a certain type of child 
and still love whichever child they have. 
33Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); In P. & S. v. Poland, 2012 Eur. Ct. 
H.R., the Court reiterated that the notion of private life within the meaning of 
Article 8 applies both to decisions to become and not to become a parent. 
34Article 8 (2) of the European Convention on Human Rights. In App. 16899/13 
Kocherov and Sergeyeva v. Russia (29/3/2106) the European Court of Human 
Rights held that despite the legitimacy of the aims of the state laws under Article 
8 (2) of the Convention, the reasons had been insufficient to justify the 
interference with family life, which had been disproportionate to the legitimate 
aim pursued. 
35An argument from symmetry suggests that human rights are equally protected 
both in their ‘positive’ form (the right to do or to obtain something) and their 
‘negative’ form (the right to refrain from doing or obtaining something). In the 
context of this paper, the right to parent is a ‘positive’ right and the right not to 
parent is a ‘negative’ right. Barak-Erez & Shapira argue that merely presenting 
the positive right as symmetric to the negative right does not entail any 
normative conclusion and may result in maneuvering by other moral arguments. 
They demonstrate this point by discussing the seemingly symmetric rights to 
parent and not to parent. Daphne Barak-Erez & Ron Shapira, The Delusion of 
Symmetric Rights, 19 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 297 (1999). Such substitution 
of moral arguments with legal arguments was discussed in European Court of 
Human Rights Chamber judgment Mizzi v. Malta (12.01.06). There, a Maltese 
court denied a request to repudiate a man’s paternity of a child that was born to 
his wife, despite DNA evidence. The ECHR held that there had been a violation 
of Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) of the Convention of 
Human Rights, considering that a fair balance had not been struck between the 
general interest of the protection of legal certainty of family relationships and 
the applicant’s right to have the legal presumption of his paternity reviewed in 
the light of the biological evidence. 
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discomfort is clear when parents wish to choose a child with blonde 
hair and blue eyes. Screening for a physical trait is less controversial 
when both parents are carriers of Cystic Fibrosis and wish to 
diagnostically screen for embryos who lack their defective gene. 
Both blonde hair and the Cystic Fibrosis gene are physical traits that 
can be biologically traced and controlled. Morally, these parental 
choices may be viewed differently, but is there a difference when 
considering them legally? 
The desire for a healthy, intelligent offspring, preferably with 
physical resemblance, is understandable and usually expected by 
many adults, 36  but is also encouraged by many states. 37  Legal 
systems allow for medical practices that ensure that prospective 
parents fulfill their wishes for desired parenthood and avoids the 
difficulties of raising a child with mental or physical disabilities. 
States provide legal instruments that enable this negative aspect of 
the parentage right. These legal instruments include the prerogative 
of prospective parents to choose their child by process of adoption; 
selective abortion, both negative (choosing not to parent impaired 
embryos) and positive (choosing a specific desired trait); and 
prenatal and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), both 
negative (as in screening out undesired embryos) and positive 
(choosing embryos with specific traits for implantation). 
 
A. ADOPTION 
 
The legal manifestation of ‘conditional parentage’ could easily 
be demonstrated in adoption laws. Adoption is defined in the New 
York Consolidated Laws and Domestic Relations Law as a legal 
process by which “a person takes another person into the relation of 
child and thereby acquires the rights and incurs the responsibilities 
of parent in respect of such other person.” 38  While in some 
jurisdictions authorities may choose the prospective adopters,39 in 
all jurisdictions allow prospective adopters opt into this process with 
                                                                                                                                        
36Barak-Erez & Shapira, Id. at 302, deem this to be an existential choice, yet 
admit that for others, not becoming a parent may be an existential choice as 
well. 
37Yehezkel Margalit, Scarce Medical Resources – Parenthood at Every Age, In 
Every Case, and Subsided by the State? 9 Netanya Academic College Law 
Review 191 (2014) (Heb.). 
38N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 110 (2010). Interestingly, in all three jurisdictions 
studied in this paper there is no explicit definition of adoption in the legislature. 
39Such is the case in England and Wales under Section 21(1) of Adoption and 
Children Act, 2002. 
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no coercion, and exercising full autonomy. 40  This autonomy is 
granted to them under the right to parent. We argue that the adoption 
processes are a form of conditional parenting, both in the negative 
aspect and in the positive aspect. 
Most children are born to parents who did not retain any 
medical or administrative intervention or assistance in conception or 
pregnancy.41 The traits of these offspring are not chosen in advance 
and indeed, some are born to their parents’ dismay, with undesired 
traits. Some of these children, as well as those born to mothers and 
fathers that are unable to attend to their needs, are put up by the state 
for adoption. Under legal systems in which adopting parents can 
choose the adopted child, these parents may exercise their right not 
to parent. 
In this section, we argue that when refusal to adopt a specific 
child does not revoke the eligibility to adopt a different child, 
conditional parentage is practiced. We do acknowledge that perhaps 
some jurisdictions may bar prospective adopters from enrolling in 
the system if they restrict the choice of adopted children. However, 
in the three jurisdictions that we compare this is not the case. In 
England, France, and Israel adoption laws do not specify such 
sanction. Research also supports our claim that prospective adopters 
do in fact base their decision to adopt on characteristics of the 
prospective adoptee.42 Furthermore, the adoption policies in many 
                                                                                                                                        
40In France an explicit request by adopters must be made to the Tribunal de 
Grande to grant an adoption order. See Art. 353 of the French Civil Code. Such 
is the requirement in Israel as well. See Sec. 1(a) to the Children Adoption Law, 
1981. 
41In 2015, artificial reproductive technology contributed to only 1.7% of all 
infants born in the United States. See Saswati Sunderam, Dmitry M. Kissin, Sara 
B. Crawford, Suzanne G. Folger, Sheree L. Boulet, Lee Warner and Wanda D. 
Barfield, Assisted Reproductive Technology Surveillance – United States, 2015, 
67(No. SS-3) MMWR SURVEILL. SUMM. 1 (2018). Available 
at: http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.ss6703a1. By comparison, in France, one 
in 35 births (2.9%) in 2012 was a result of assisted reproductive technology. See 
AGANCE DE LA BIOMEDICINE, ACTIVITÉ D’ASSISTANCE MÉDICALE À LA 
PROCRÉATION 2012 (2013), available at: https://www.agence-
biomedecine.fr/annexes/bilan2013/donnees/procreation/01-amp/pdf/amp.pdf/. 
42Matthew D. Bramlett & Laura F. Radel, Factors Associated with Adoption and 
Adoption Intentions of Nonparental Caregivers 19(1) ADOPTION QUARTERLY 
(2016); Sarah Carnochan, Megan Moore & Michael J Austin, Achieving Timely 
Adoption, 10(3) J EVID BASED SOC WORK 210 (2013); Jessica Snowden, Scott 
Leon & Jeffrey Sieracki, Predictors of children in foster care being adopted: A 
classification tree analysis, 30(11) CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES REVIEW 
1318 (2008); Tom McDonald, Alan Press, Peggy Billings & Terry Moore, 
Partitioning the adoption process to better predict permanency, 86(3) CHILD 
WELFARE 5 (2007); Christian Connell, Karol H. Katz, Leon Saunders & Jacob 
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jurisdictions are based on the growing need for permanent 
placement of children in need and active encouragement and support 
of prospective adopters,43 thus, it seems unlikely to ban interested 
adopters from adopting because of their preferences. 
In England, the adoption process is governed by the Adoption 
and Children Act, 2002. Under this law, state-recognized services 
are entailed with the task of matching approved adopters with 
children waiting for a family.44 In a guide provided for prospective 
adopters, the matching process is described: “If there is a potential 
match… your details would be sent to the child’s social worker and 
the child’s social worker would send the child’s details to your 
social worker for you to think about: [emphasis added].45 We read 
this statement as an invitation to practice conditional parentage since 
prospective parents are encouraged to choose their adopted child 
and allowed to refrain from choosing a child they do not desire. This 
popular website, although not of any legal merit, is indicative of 
adoption policies in England.46 
The Adoption and Children Act itself does not prescribe such 
a process in the detail provided in the guide. However, when 
detailing conditions for making adoption orders 47  and the 
restrictions on making adoption orders,48 the Act is silent regarding 
the question of whether the match was the first to be made, or 
whether adopters refused the previous matching. The legislature 
does state that in determining the suitability of a couple to adopt a 
child, proper regard should be given to the need for stability and 
permanence in their relationship.49 Since no case law linked this 
section with refusal to adopt a specific child, interpretation could go 
both ways. One might suggest that ‘picky-choosy’ parents are not as 
stable as demanded, while others might see their final choice as a 
sign of a permanent decision. Either way, if no English court had 
ever revoked eligibility of adopters based on the fact that they chose 
                                                                                                                                        
K. Tebes, Leaving foster care – The influence of child and case characteristics 
on exit rates, 28(7) CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES REVIEW 780 (2006). 
43Clair Fenton-Glynn, Adoption without consent, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR 
HEALTH, “ADOPTION: A NEW APPROACH” (DECEMBER 2000). 
44Adoption and Children Act, 2002, Section 2. 
45First4adoption, First Steps, http://www.first4adoption.org.uk/first-steps-
complete/, (First4Adoption is the national information service for people 
interested in adopting a child in England). 
46Fenton-Glynn, supra note 43. 
47Adoption and Children Act, supra note 44, § 47. 
48Id. § 48. 
49Id. § 45(2). 
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their adopted child, it is fair to conclude that adoption laws in 
England enable a practice of conditional parentage. 
When comparing the English law with the legal framework in 
the United States, similar conclusions may be drawn. Although in 
the United States there is limited federal constitutional and statutory 
law since adoption is controlled by state law,50 general features of 
adoption law that are common across most states.51 Similarly to 
English law, both the general provisions of the United States federal 
law and the more specific regulation by the states, no restriction on 
the parents to actively choose their adopted child could not be found. 
We also found no restrictions to parental freedom of choice in 
Israeli, nor in French adoption legislation or case law. 
Moreover, several states have recently enacted statutes that 
recognize and allow enforcement of “open adoption” or post-
adoption contact agreements between birth and adoptive families, 
and some states even recognize “non-binding open adoption” 
agreements.52 By recognizing the autonomy of parents to transfer 
and receive parental privileges and responsibilities through 
contracts, the states acknowledge the autonomy of prospective 
adopters to choose to adopt a specific child. In our view, this is a 
legal recognition of the practice of conditional parentage. 
                                                                                                                                        
50Several uniform adoption acts have been proposed for the states, but only a 
few states have adopted them: NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS OF UNIF. STATE 
LAWS, UNIF. ADOPTION ACT (1969), http://www.uniform 
laws.org/shared/docs/adoption/adoption69.pdf; NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
COMM’RS OF UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIF. ADOPTION ACT (1994), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/adoption/uaa_final_94.pdf. 
The 1969 Act has been adopted in Arkansas, Iowa, New Mexico, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma: Legislative Fact Sheet – Adoption Act (1953) (1969), UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N, 
http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Adoption%20Act%20%
281953%29%281969%29 (last visited May 11, 2018). 
The 1994 Act has been adopted in Vermont: Legislative Fact Sheet – Adoption 
Act (1994), UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N, http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Adoption%20
Act%20%281994%29 
(last visited May 11, 2018). 
51Luis Acosta, Adoption Law: United States, Library of Congress, 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/adoption-law/unitedstates.php#f2 (last visited 
May 11, 2018). 
52Id. at n. 24 (A listing and discussion of these statutes can be found in Joan 
Heifetz Hollinger, Adoption Law and Practice (2012) in sections 13-B.01 to 13-
B.03. See also Yehezkel Margalit, Towards Determining Legal Parentage by 
Agreement in Israel, 42 HEB. U. L. REV. (MISHPATIM) 835, 856-57 
(2012)(Heb.)). 
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Not only modern legal systems are not the only systems to 
recognize adoptive parents’ choice of a child. Another form of 
conditional parentage can be found in the Jewish law. The Jewish 
status of mamzer (bastard), is among other reasons given to a child 
conceived as a result of incest. This status prevents the marriage of 
a mamzer with any other Jew that is not a mamzer as well. The status 
of mamzer cannot ever be erased. This status, however, does not 
apply to non-Jews resulting in some Jewish adoptive-parents prefer 
the adoption of non-Jewish children53 in order to avoid the fear of 
creating unintentional incest in the future for their adopted child.54 
This form of selective adoption could also be considered selective 
parentage. 
 
B. ABORTION 
 
The pro-life/pro-choice debate is beyond the scope of this 
paper, since abortion is legal in all three jurisdictions compared.55 
For our purpose, we claim that in legal systems where abortion is 
legitimate, even if only under specific circumstances, it is a form of 
conditional parentage. The law on selective abortion in the UK is 
one example.56 Under the UK Act, if there is “a substantial risk that 
if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental 
abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped,” the parents may 
terminate the pregnancy and not parent the unborn child.57 The same 
condition is also required under Israeli law.58 Comparatively, under 
the French Code, the pregnant woman is free to terminate her 
pregnancy before its twelfth week based solely on her reluctance to 
continue it.59 This arrangement allows for an even wider scope of 
                                                                                                                                        
53This preference is not allowed under the Israeli Adoption Law 1981, Article 5, 
determining the religion of adoptive parents to be that of the adopted child. Such 
provision does not exist in other legal systems, such as the UK or the US. 
54However, this preference contradicts a different important principle in Jewish 
law, which is the preservation of Jewish bloodline. For the debate on this issue 
in Jewish Law, see YEHEZKEL MARGALIT, THE JEWISH FAMILY: BETWEEN 
FAMILY LAW AND CONTRACT LAW (2017), p.165 and the citations in footnote 
127. 
55In England and Wales abortion is regulated in the Abortion Act 1967; in 
France it is regulated in the Public Health Code, 1975, last amended in 2016: 
Code de la Santé Publique, 1975 : articles L2212-1 à L2212-11; and in Israel it 
is regulated in the Penal Code 1977, Articles 312-321. 
56Abortion Act 1967 (UK). 
57Id. § 1(1)(d). 
58Israeli Penal Code, 5737-1977, Art. 316(a)(3). 
59French Public Health Code Art. L2212-1. 
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parental selection, including social reasons to abort a pregnancy, 
such as lack of ability to offer a happy childhood. 
The selective process in England and Israel is subject to 
physicians’ discretion, which is not often challenged in court. The 
judicial review on the doctors’ assessment of the substantiality of 
the risk or of the seriousness of the potential handicap is rarely 
successful. Since the law requires the doctors to conclude their 
prognosis in ‘good faith’, courts tend to refrain from intervening in 
their medical assessment.60 As a result, the reality is that in all three 
jurisdictions, a prospective parent is able to opt-out of parentage 
based on their will not to parent specific offspring, possibly due to 
physical or mental disadvantages. We regard this negative selection 
as conditional parentage. 
The right of the pregnant woman to choose not to parent her 
unborn fetus is also protected under the European Convention of 
Human Rights, particularly under Article 8, which protects the right 
for private and family life. The European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) is willing to protect the decision to abort a pregnancy as an 
inherent part of a woman’s private and family life. However, it has 
decided that its regulation is still consistent with section two of the 
article,61 allowing states to interfere with this right in the interests of 
protecting “morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.” 62  Furthermore, the Court considered a lack of a clear 
procedure to review the legitimate criteria for abortion to be in 
breach of Article 8 of the Convention, thus creating a positive 
obligation on the states to regulate abortions.63 
Wrongful birth claims, acknowledged by some legal systems,64 
compensate parents for the lost opportunity to abort unwanted 
                                                                                                                                        
60In Jepson v The Chief Constable of West Mercia Police Constabulary, [2003] 
EWHC (Ch) 3318, a reverend requested a police investigation against the 
doctors who approved abortion of a fetus suspected to be born with clef lip and 
palate. As police concluded that the doctors’ decision was in good faith the 
complaint was reverted. This incident is quite rare and unique, and we were not 
able to locate similar cases. For accounts of the developments in this case see 
Scott, supra note 2, at 72. 
61Bruggemann and Scheuten v Germany, App. No. 6959/75, 3 Eur. Comm’n 
H.R. 244 (1981). 
62European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8(2), Nov. 4, 1950. 
63Tysiac v Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R. Appl. No. 5410/03 [2007] available at: 
https://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/Ty
siac_decision.pdf 
64For a comparative account of such claims in the United States, England and 
France see Maria Canellopoulou Bottis, Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life 
Actions, 11 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW 55 (2004). In Israel this 
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offspring. This imposes liability on physicians to offer parental 
selection to parents suspected of having a child with a disability.65 
We learn from this that parents are entitled under the law not only 
to select whether to parent a fetus or not, but also to receive 
information about the physical traits of the prospective child as a 
basis for making their decision. 
Another aspect of parents’ legitimate practice of conditional 
parentage could also be observed in the claim for compensation for 
negligent sterilization in certain cases. It is worthy to note that it is 
not the mere parentage that is the damage claimed, as the birth of a 
healthy child does not usually constitute a tort claim.66 The Queen 
Bench in the UK awarded parents compensation for financial 
damages only where the child was born with “severe learning 
difficulties.”67 We see this as support of our claim that prospective 
parents are entitled to place conditions – specifically physical or 
medical ones - on their parentage. 
So far, in the discussion on abortion, we have detailed mainly 
aspects of negative selection where health reasons have justified 
conditional parentage. However, conditional parentage, is not 
restricted to medical reasons. In several legal systems, social reasons 
were also acknowledged by the ECHR as legitimate for aborting a 
pregnancy.68 We learn from this that conditional parentage is a legal 
phenomenon that is wider than the realm of health and medicine. 
However, for the discussion of Eugenics, there is no significance to 
reasons of parental selection that are not intended to better the 
physical traits of their offspring. 
 
C. PREIMPLANTATION GENETIC DIAGNOSIS (PGD) 
 
Over the last century, the means for becoming a parent has 
evolved significantly.  Society today benefits from having many 
diverse methods of conception. One method is assisted reproduction 
                                                                                                                                        
doctrine governed for several decades but was neglected in 2012 in the ruling of 
C.A. 1326/07 Hammer v. Amit (28.5.12). 
65See for example, the UK case of Rand v East Dorset Health Authority, 56 
BMLR 39 [2000], where the court found the health authority responsible for 
introducing parents to the choice of abortion. 
66McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [1999] 2 AC 59 (HL) (appeal taken from 
Scot.). 
67Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust [2001] QB 
266. 
68RH v Norway, App. 17004/90 Eur. Commm’n H.R. (1992), available at: 
https://www.globalhealthrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/H.-v.-
NORWAY.pdf 
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today can be performed by in-vitro fertilization, (IVF). In this 
process, a zygote is created by manipulating a sperm cell into an 
egg, thus creating an embryo in a laboratory. Due to the risk 
involved in harvesting eggs, most procedures require the production 
and harvesting of several eggs from a woman. Therefore, it is usual 
to produce several embryos in one IVF treatment. The multiple 
embryos created in the IVF process allow the performance of PGD. 
During the PGD process, once the embryo develops and contains 
several cells, one or more of these cells are removed and examined 
to detect specific genes. This technique enables the detection of 
genetic traits, both desired and undesired, and allows parents to 
choose which of the embryos to implant in the woman’s womb. 
The process of PGD is helpful for detecting both single gene 
defects, such as Cystic Fibrosis, as well as other chromosomal 
disorders, such as Down Syndrome. Prospective parents can choose 
a single suitable embryo from multiple potential offspring to implant 
and birth. As genome mapping develops, it is possible to screen for 
any type of genetic traits, not only for defects or chromosomal 
disorders. Almost any desired or undesired gene could be diagnosed 
and screened, if not today, then in the foreseeable future.69 This 
possibility is, of course, of great controversy.70 
In Italy, for example, a rule stating that only three embryos 
could be created by IVF and that all must be transferred to a 
woman’s uterus, 71  essentially banning PGD, was declared 
unconstitutional by the Italian Constitutional Court in 200872 and 
later by the European Court of Human Rights. 73  In 2012, the right 
of a fertile couple to seek medically assisted reproduction was 
acknowledged, and Italy was condemned for banning it. The ECHR 
judges pointed out the inconsistency in Italian law denying the 
couple access to embryo screening while authorizing medically-
assisted termination of pregnancy in cases where the fetus was 
suspected of a genetic disease. 
                                                                                                                                        
69James Watson, A Personal View of the Project, THE CODE OF THE CODES: 
SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL ISSSUES IN THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT (Daniel 
Kevles & Leroy Hood, eds, 1992). 
70Richard Lewontin, BIOLOGY AS IDEOLOGY: THE DOCTRINE OF DNA (1992). 
71Norme in materia di procreazione medicalmente assistita, Legge 19 febbraio 
2004, n. 40 (It.). 
72Giuseppe Benagiano & Luca Gianaroli, The Italian Constitutional Court 
modifies Italian legislation on assisted reproduction technology, 20 REPROD. 
BIOMED. ONLINE 398, 399 (2010). Available at: 
https://www.rbmojournal.com/article/S1472-6483(09)00280-6/pdf 
73Costa and Pavan v. Italy, App. No. 54270/2010, Eur. Ct. H.R., 2012. 
Available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=002-6452 
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To prevent misuse of PGD, some countries regulate it by law. 
In England, for example, the Human Fertilization and Embryology 
Act of 1990 (HFEA) governs the provision of IVF under a Code of 
Practice. Under this code, produced by the Advisory Committee of 
Genetic Testing, embryo selection is generally restricted by 
regulatory provisions.74 PGD should only be available where there 
is a “significant risk of a serious genetic condition… in the 
embryo.” 75  The HFEA attempts to detail such risks in several 
provisions, which relate to the prospective well-being of the future 
child. The conditions of the license provided by the Human 
Fertilization and Embryology Authority to perform PGD, under 
paragraph 1 of Schedule 2 to this Act, are detailed in Schedule 13 
and include risks such as “a serious physical or mental disability” or 
“a serious illness.”76 
In France, the law allows a specially certified fertility specialist 
to perform PGD, but only to select against  serious, incurable 
diseases. 77  Under another law, an agency (Agence de la 
Biomédecine) was created and authorized to oversee assisted 
reproductive technology and PGD.78 The Agency sends parents who 
wish to perform PGD for assessment at a specialized 
interdisciplinary center (Centre Pluridisciplinaire de Diagnostic 
Prénatal), that determines whether the conditions are sufficiently 
severe and whether the relevant genetic information is sufficiently 
prognostic.79 
In Israel, where reproduction and fertility play a very central 
role in the culture, 80  PGD is practiced intensely, putting Israeli 
women among the world’s biggest consumers of prenatal genetic 
tests, genetic profiling, and counselling. 81  This practice is 
encouraged by generous state funding for PGD and other forms of 
                                                                                                                                        
74Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 [hereinafter: HEFA], § 13(9) 
and (10) (UK). 
75Advisory Committee of Genetic Testing, Consultation Document on 
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, November 1999. 
76HEFA, supra note 74, paragraph 9 Schedule 13. 
77Loi relative à la bioéthique, 2011. Loi no. 2011–814 (France). 
78Loi relative à la bioéthique, 2004. Loi no. 2004–800 (France). 
79REP. AGENCE DE LA BIOMEDECINE, LE DIAGNOSTIC PREIMPLANTATOIRE ET 
VOUS (2012), http://www.agence-
biomedecine.fr/IMG/pdf/2012_brochure_dpi_vdef.pdf. 
80Sigrid Vertommen, Towards a political economy of egg cell donations: ‘Doing 
it the Israeli Way’, CRITICAL KINSHIP STUDIES: KINSHIP (TRANS)FORMED 169, 
169 (Charlotte Kroløkke, ed., 2016). 
81Id.. 
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assisted reproduction.82 Regulation of PGD in Israel is not enforced 
by law but by administrative instructions to laboratories83 and by 
scholarly discussions of its bioethical issues. 84   Under these 
regulatory regime, PGD is intended to prevent genetically induced 
mental and physical disparities, but is both comparatively broad in 
the scope of conditions that allow for such intervention, as well as 
comparatively loose in the state’s enforcement of the guidelines.  In 
this regard, Israel stands out as the most liberal in conditional 
parentage by means of PGD, out of the jurisdictions examined here. 
Both England and France are stricter in their access to PGD.85 
In the United States, PGD is not regulated by law, but is 
discussed in guidelines and recommendations by professional 
societies. The Ethics Committee of the American Society for 
Reproductive Medicine published an opinion that considers PGD for 
adult-onset conditions “ethically justifiable” when the condition is 
serious and there are no known, or only extremely burdensome, 
interventions available. This opinion also states that PGD is 
“ethically acceptable as a matter of reproductive liberty” for even 
less serious or lower penetrance conditions.86 Also, The American 
College of Medical Genetics’ recommendations on PGD are to leave 
to the parents the decision whether they want to receive and act upon 
information about the genetic conditions regarding their future 
child.87 
                                                                                                                                        
82Westreich, supra note 26. 
83Ministry of Health, Guidelines for Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD), 
instructions no. 50/2006 (20.12.2006) (Heb.). 
84There are many scholarly discussions in academic literature, but the most 
‘formal’ report was published by the Israel National Science Academy, which 
was based on the guidelines Id.. See NATIONAL BIOETHICS COMMITTEE, 
“BIOETHICAL ISSUES IN PREIMPLANTATION GENETIC DIAGNOSIS (PGD) 
(Michelle Rabal, ed. 2008) (Heb.). 
85Restricted access to assisted reproductive technologies are discussed in SACHA 
REBECCA WAXMAN, THE PRE-CONCEPTION WELFARE PRINCIPLE: A CASE 
AGAINST REGULATION (A Thesis Submitted to the University of Manchester 
School of Law for the Degree of Doctor of Bioethics and Medical 
Jurisprudence, 2017). 
86Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Use of 
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis for Serious Adult Onset Conditions: A 
Committee Opinion, 100 FERTIL. STERIL. 54 (2013). 
87Wayne W. Grody, Barry H. Thompson, Anthony R. Gregg, Lora H. 
Bean, Kristin G. Monaghan, Adele Schneider & Roger V. Lebo, ACMG position 
statement on prenatal/preconception expanded carrier screening, 15(5) GEN. 
MED. 482 (2013), https://www.nature.com/articles/gim201347. 
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These provisions relate mainly to negative PGD; that is, the 
choice not to implant an embryo with genetic defects.88 Despite on-
going debate regarding the scope of “significant risk” 89  and of 
“seriousness of genetic condition,” 90  the choice of prospective 
parents to prevent illness from their prospected offspring is largely 
accepted both by society and by law. Therefore, negative PGD is a 
both a medically and legally legitimate practice of parental 
selection. 
The most significant challenge to PGD is its positive aspect, 
which is choosing to implant an embryo with specific genetic traits. 
One practice that was challenged under the PGD license was the 
practice of creating a ‘savior sibling’. Since PGD enables the 
selection of embryos with specific genetic traits, prospective parents 
are medically able to create a sibling for their child of their desired 
genetic form. With this practice, a genetic match could be created to 
enable organ transplant to the sibling. 
The debate over whether the practice of positive PGD is 
legitimate under the HFEA arose in the Quintavalle case.91  The 
parents of a boy born with a serious genetic disorder sought IVF 
treatment in which any embryo would be tested for its pre-
implantation genetic status. They requested that only an embryo 
capable of producing the stem cells necessary to cure the boy would 
be implanted. The HFEA refused to license such a procedure since 
it would not constitute treatment of the mother within the Act. It was 
held that the Act required only that the procedures undertaken 
should be in the course of treating the mother. Such treatment would 
include many procedures not directly affecting her. This procedure 
would be considered treatment in the context of the treating the 
mother, putting it within the scope of the Authority to consider and 
therefore license such procedures. 
Positive PGD was also acceptable in France in 2013, on a case-
by-case basis. Following recommendations from Centre 
Pluridisciplinaire de Diagnostic Prénatal, the director of the Agence 
de la Biomédecine decided to permit the use of PGD for Human 
Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) tissue matching, to select for siblings 
                                                                                                                                        
88We wish to note that the provision that allows for sex-selection under this Act, 
to prevent gender-related serious medical conditions in the embryo, might also 
be regarded as ‘negative’ PGD. This is based on the purpose of the procedure, to 
prevent a genetic trait. Id., paragraph 10 Schedule 13. 
89Scott, supra note 2 at 207. 
90Id, at 208. 
91Quintavalle v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, [2005] UKHL 
28. 
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who can serve as tissue donors.92 Although the decision does not 
grant a general license to preform PGD for every ‘sibling savior’ 
practice, it is indicative of the legitimacy for parents to select their 
newborn based on a specific genetic trait. 
Another form of positive PGD attracted fierce criticism when 
a lesbian couple in the United States deliberately chose to have a 
deaf baby.93 The two women, both mental health specialists and deaf 
themselves, said they had wanted a child that would be like 
themselves, claiming they would make better parents to a deaf child. 
The couple was scrutinized publicly, but was autonomous to decide 
so legally. In the United States, choosing disability, just as choosing 
to prevent one, is not regulated by law and is left to parental 
discretion. Furthermore, selecting someone with a disability does 
not inevitably mean selecting a child with a lower quality of life.94 
This couple’s choice provoked a debate over the morality of their 
decision. 95  Nonetheless, whether one sides with or rejects the 
parental choice, the fact of the matter is that a choice can and had 
been made, making this couple’s parentage conditioned to the 
prospective child’s deafness. 
To summarize this chapter, we can conclude that conditional 
parentage takes place under diverse legal frameworks, such as 
adoption, abortion and PGD. We can firmly argue that although 
these practices are refrained from being labeled as eugenics, they are 
in fact forms of parental selection based on physical and genetic 
traits. We can also conclude that these medical-legal phenomena are 
well accepted both by law and society. 
 
IV. DELICATE BALANCE – GUIDELINES FOR 
REGULATING EUGENICS 
 
Our claim is that eugenics are a fact of life in modern society. 
In contrast to the concerns that justified eugenic practices in the past, 
parental autonomy is the core justification for eugenics today. 
                                                                                                                                        
92Agence de la Biomedecine, Conseil D’Orientation Modification Des Criteres 
D’Agrements En Genetique Concernant Le HLA, Deliberation N. 2013-CO-45 
(France, Nov. 21, 2013). Available at: http://www.agence-
biomedecine.fr/IMG/pdf/deliberation_2013_co_45.pdf 
93David Teather, Lesbian couple have deaf baby by choice, THE GUARDIAN (8 
April, 2002). Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/apr/08/davidteather 
94Wilkinson, supra note 32 at 61. 
95Julian Savulescu & Robert Sparrow, Making Better Babies: Pro and Con, 
31(1) MONASH BIOETHICS REVIEW 36, (2013). 
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Unlike the paternalistic laws of the past that coerced prospective 
parents into eugenic practices, such as prevention of intermarriage 
or sterilization, the laws of our time are balancing wishes of 
prospective parents to use eugenic practices with other important 
concerns. Such concerns include community diversity and the 
offspring’s quality of life. 
Although eugenics can serve justifiable means, eugenics are 
prone to abuse and misuse. We acknowledge that both alleviating 
all boundaries, on one hand, and coercing parents to parent, on the 
other, is undesired. As Agar argues, the use of genetic engineering 
should be tailored to the needs of those who wish to improve their 
life plans, but would also shield societies from being shaped in the 
form dictated by dominant values.96 In this summative section we 
offer choices of methods for the regulation of eugenics, based on the 
forms of regulation in other conditional parentage practices. 
To accomplish the balance of parental autonomy with societal 
morality, four forms of regulating conditional parentage are 
recognized in this paper. We named these types of potential methods 
of regulation: (1) information-based autonomy, (2) intervention only 
in positive selection, (3) legal guidelines for parental selection, and 
(4) case-by-case review. Outlining these methods of dealing with 
eugenic presence in legal and societal lives is far from evaluating 
them. In this section, we attempt to highlight the advantages and 
challenges of each method, but we refrain from trumping one over 
the others. 
 
(1) Information-Based Autonomy 
 
The most lenient method of regulation is the non-regulation of 
conditional parentage. Under this regime, states simply leave free 
choice to the parents. For this method to be morally legitimate, 
parental choice should be based on full and valid information. We 
identify this practice in the United States regarding PGD, where 
professional associations offer education and recommendations, but 
the law does not interfere with the parental choice. 
Being a parent is hard enough…yet, many people parent 
because they choose to, not because they are coerced into it. 
However, not all parents think through the potential hardships of 
parenting when choosing to procreate. For those who do, the 
information-based autonomy model suggests that it is legitimate, as 
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in any voluntary decision, to opt for hardship and to persevere. It is 
also just as legitimate to opt-out of hardship and to aim at avoiding 
it. Both decisions fall within the realm of personal autonomy.97 
This type of method bases conditional parentage on theories of 
informed consent. The expression “informed consent” relates to the 
legal obligation of a doctor to provide a patient with the information 
relevant to the decision-making and to receive consent prior to any 
medical procedure being carried out. Informed consent is mandatory 
prior to obtaining medical treatment. However, when regulating 
conditional parentage, it is not mandatory but voluntary. The parents 
have a right to be provided with information98 and a right to choose 
their course of action accordingly, but their actions are not 
conditioned on their consent to this information. The obligatory 
nature of the information lies on the state to provide it, not on the 
parents to accept it. 
The question is how much information and what type of 
information should be given to the parents to enable them to be truly 
informed. Neither legislature, court rulings, nor literature has yet 
provided a definitive answer.99 Courts tend to decide based on a 
standard of “reasonability” when discussing the breadth and depth 
of the information given by a physician to a patient.100 These rulings 
are intended to deal only with the health of the patient, and do not 
deal with the implications on the prospective offspring or society. 
We argue that under this method of regulating conditional 
parentage, it is the state’s duty to inform parents of all aspects of 
their decision. We fear that without a legal requirement to provide 
the parents with information regarding a wide set of considerations, 
it is unclear whether this method of regulating conditional parentage 
                                                                                                                                        
97This ethical view was expressed in Savulescu’s remarks in Savulescu & 
Sparrow, supra note 95, at 43. 
98The French Public Health Code clearly states this in regard to abortion in Art. 
L2212-1. This is also the case in Israeli regulation for PDG, supra note 83. 
However, even under such requirement, any information given to parents is of 
course pending funding and availability. 
99Margaret A. Somerville, Labels Versus contents: Variance Between 
Philosophy, Psychiatry and Law in the Concepts Governing Decision Making, 
39 MCGILL L.J. 179 (1994); EDWARDS RICHARDS & KATHARINE RATHBUN, 
LAW AND THE PHYSICIANS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 145 (1993); GEORGE POZGAR, 
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100See for example Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309 
(1994); see also Canada’s High Court of Justice in Arndt. v. Smith, 126 D.L.R 
(4th) 705 (1995); Arndt v. Smith, 148, D.L.R (4th) 48 (1997); see also Australia’s 
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ECHR 2013/14 Csoma v. Romania, 15 January 2013, no. 8759/05 (Third 
Section). 
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can lay within the framework of the doctrine of informed consent. 
Research suggests that manipulation of information may give 
prospective parents the sense that they are making a free choice, 
while they are actually “nudged” into a choice that is preferable for 
certain stakeholders.101 This approach does not coerce the parents’ 
decision, thus respecting their autonomy, but rather puts a burden on 
the state to provide valid information on all aspects of the decision. 
Do we trust parents to make a decision that would balance both 
their needs and societal concerns? 102  Should parental skills or 
abilities determine the approval or refusal to allow parental 
selection? Should a less capable parent be given more freedom to 
choose their prospective offspring? Although not all people are fit 
to parent, the literature on parenting admits that it is not possible to 
establish what makes a “good” parent. 103  With no agreed or 
research-based good-parenting guidelines, such limitation on 
parental autonomy seems arbitrary, offensive and inefficient. It 
does, however, infuse doubt into the information-based autonomy 
regulatory method. 
 
(2) Intervention in ‘Positive’ Selection 
 
The next form of regulation of parental choice is found in most 
adoption laws. This type of regulation differentiates between 
‘negative’ and ‘positive’ selection. Despite the fact that there is no 
judicial intervention in negative adoption (the prospective parents’ 
choice not to adopt a certain child), there is, however, much 
intervention in ‘positive’ adoption (i.e. courts protect or deny 
prospective parents’ choice to adopt a specific child). Under this 
regime, the state is prohibited from intervening in peoples’ decision 
not to parent an offspring with specific traits while allowing the state 
to intervene in the positive choice to parent-specific offspring. In 
                                                                                                                                        
101Ignaas Devisch, Progress in Medicine: Autonomy, Oughtonomy and Nudging, 
17 J. EVAL. CLIN. PRACT. 857, 859-60 (2011). 
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several legal systems, the right not to parent overrides the right to 
parent,104 and it is legitimate to allow parents to opt-out of parenting. 
Regulating positive conditional parentage by state intervention 
is contrary to the principle of ‘Procreative Beneficence’.105 Under 
this principle, parents do not only have reason to want the best for 
their children, but they are also morally obligated to attempt to 
produce the best child possible. Restricting this obligation is also 
questionable in light of liberal views that do not see a moral 
difference between enhancing capabilities by intervention with 
environment (such as diet or education) and enhancing capabilities 
by genetic engineering.106 If states refrain from restricting parents 
from enhancing their children’s capabilities by adding extra tutoring 
to their education or adding vitamins to their diets, then why should 
states limit parents who are able to afford to design genetically 
enhanced babies? 
There are two justifications for state intervention in such 
parental choice. The first justification would be that non-
intervention would cause injustice by unequal distribution of 
eugenic goods. States have an obligation to distribute resources 
equally, but it is possible to justify distribution of eugenic goods by 
state regulation by means of Rawlsian justice. Rawls’s Difference 
Principle justifies deviation from equal distribution of goods, such 
as liberty and opportunity, only if the unequal distribution betters 
society as a whole, especially the least privileged in society. 107 
Therefore, a regulation model that intervenes in ‘positive’ 
conditional parentage to ensure that all prospective parents have 
access to positive selection, is considered legitimate. This can be 
achieved with generous state funding of such processes, as is the 
case in Israel.108 
The second reason for states’ regulation of positive selection 
relies on two of the many critiques of the Procreative Beneficence 
Principle. 109  The first is concerned with the possible abuse of 
                                                                                                                                        
104Barak-Erez & Shapira, supra note 35. 
105See Julian Savulescu, Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select The 
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scientific developments in parental screening, which in time will 
most likely enable more and more possibilities for selection, perhaps 
to the point of ordering an exact model of a child.110 King fears that 
parents’ preference for certain types of children is “not too far 
removed from their experience as consumers, choosing amongst 
different products.”111 Genetic diagnostics and fetal selection are 
terms generally ascribed to sinister regimes, that turn the child into 
a ‘commodity’, so such concerns are understandable.”112 It should 
be argued, though, that the commodification argument fails to 
ignore a distinction between the commercial value to parental 
selection and the actual treatment of children as commodities.113 
Thus, fear of commodification simply justifies regulation. 
The second critique is the fear of diversity. Biologically 
speaking, diversity is a strength, and genetic mutations have an 
evolutionary role. 114  It is Agar who expressed concern about 
diversity by allowing parents to choose genetic traits.115  From a 
liberal perspective, restricting parental choice,  based on what states 
consider desirable, is immoral  because it too might eliminate 
diverse life plans that are inherent to the liberal ideology.116 Having 
said that, states do intervene in the market of human improvements 
by allocating education and health funds. Shouldn’t the same 
standards be applied to both types of intervention?117 
With these perils in mind, we should also remember that there 
are tangible benefits to positive parental selection. Positive parental 
selection is not only about the moral right of autonomy nor the well-
being of the family, it is also about creating future generations with 
fewer illnesses and better prospects for success. Conditioning 
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parentage on successful, healthy offspring is not all bad, despite the 
questionable reputation of this practice. 
 
(3) Legal Guidelines for Parental Selection 
 
The third form of regulation is providing a legal framework that 
outlines the conditions for parental choice. We see this type of 
regulation in HFEA, 118  for example. Under this regime of 
regulation, conditioning parentage – both positive and negative— is 
subject to a set of legal guidelines, dictated by the legislature. The 
legislation is an expression of the common values of society. 
The argument against this method would be the loss of parental 
autonomy and state intervention in private affairs. Some argue that 
pure autonomy does not exist in modern societies, since we 
willingly relinquish our freedoms for societal order, 119  thus any 
legislative regulation could be considered “apparent paternalistic 
intervention,” since it is an intervention by the legislator that 
expresses the desires of people whose freedom is restricted, and 
these desires can be realized only within the legal limits. 120  If 
parents agree to relinquish their autonomy in areas where they want 
legislative regulation, then this is not paternalism and hence, not 
considered a loss of autonomy. 
Another argument reiterates the one expressed above, 
regarding the dominance of national values over private ones. 
Modern liberal societies fear the perils of a regime that dictates 
values to individuals, especially in intimate areas of life, such as 
family and procreation, where enforcement is almost impossible. 
Such regulation is deemed obsolete and dangerous. Although values 
change throughout the eras and locations, some values gain traction 
in many societies and are expressed in their legal systems. We see 
this, for example, in the “welfare principle.” Under this principle, 
the child’s best interests is the paramount consideration in any 
decision concerning them.121 The European Convention of Human 
Right acknowledged state interference in family life could be 
considered a breach of human rights if not justified by the values in 
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consensus. 122  The exception in Article 8 of the convention 
acknowledges conditions that justify legal intervention in family 
life, where societal well-being is at risk. 
Further support for the legislature-based model can be based on 
some of the critiques to the information-based model. There are 
prominent voices in the bioethics community arguing for “the right 
to remain in ignorance.” 123  While testing for genetic disorders 
contributes to the family’s knowledge of the genetic make-up of 
their prospective child, it does not prevent harm to future children. 
Such practices serve only the interests of the parents but not that of 
their future child. Therefore, it is ethically wrong to base a decision 
regarding future children on the same standards for informed 
consent as any other medical treatment. Under a legislative regime, 
allocating eugenic goods it is not left solely to the parents’ 
autonomy, but rather the future children’s interests are to be 
regarded as well. 
It is also possible to justify the state distribution of eugenic 
goods through state regulation by means of Rawlsian justice. As 
mentioned, Rawls’s Difference Principle justifies deviation from the 
equal distribution of goods, such as liberty and opportunity only if 
the unequal distribution better society as a whole, especially the 
ones with lesser influence in society.124 Rawls’ approach serves the 
argument for negative selection (such as enhancing resistance to the 
flu) because it serves more lives than positive selection (such as 
height or musical talent). Some traits, such as the enhancement of 
intelligence, are not as easily categorized.125 Should it be considered 
beneficial to the individual, thus, unjustified by Rawls, or can it help 
society as a whole, thus, justified? 
To summarize the model of legislative regulation, we can argue 
on one hand, for a clear and balanced expression of common societal 
values. On the other hand, concerns for the overriding of national 
values over personal values are also to be reckoned with. This 
                                                                                                                                        
122Troxel, supra note 33. 
123See Rebecca Bennett, Antenatal Genetic Testing and the Right to Remain in 
Ignorance, 22(5) THEOR. MED. BIOETH. 461 (2001) (coining the term); see also 
Elisa Garc´ıa, Danielle R. M. Timmermans & Evert van Leeuwen, Rethinking 
Autonomy In The Context Of Prenatal Screening, 28 PRENAT. DIAGN. 115 
(2008); see also Ainsley J.Newson, Ethical Aspects Arising From Non-Invasive 
Fetal Diagnosis, 13(2) SEMIN. FETAL NEONAT. M. 103 (2008) (citing Bennette). 
124Rawls, supra note 107. 
125See JEFF LYON & PETER CORNER, ALTERED FATES: GENE THERAPY AND THE 
RETOOLING OF HUMAN LIFE 543 (1995), for a discussion that science can 
already to attribute intelligence to a section in the genome. 
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delicate balance in modern legal systems is scrutinized and 
examined by the judiciary, to ensure legitimate use of legislative 
powers and sufficient attentiveness to parental choice. 
 
(4) Case-by-Case Review 
 
The last form of possible regulation of conditional parentage 
could be the case-by-case review by a multidisciplinary board of 
experts. Such a regulatory method is applied in France for 
determining the legitimacy of positive PDG in the case of “sibling 
savior” parentage. Regulating parentage on a case-by-case method 
has the advantage of applying specific consideration to the specific 
family’s needs. The board’s deliberation process can contribute to 
the family’s sense of justice and therefore, respects their right to due 
process. The use of professionals, not merely state administrators, 
minimizes the risk of dogmatic dictation of societal values and shifts 
the focus on medical and ethical concerns, rather than national 
concerns. 
As in every regulatory procedure that is not unified and 
standard, legal certainty and expectations are compromised. It is 
nearly impossible to conduct a regulatory system where most 
decisions are governed on a case-by-case basis, for two possible 
reasons. One reason is that it puts enormous strain on public 
resources. As technology advances, selective parentage becomes 
more easily accessible by potential parents. If the professional board 
becomes the only obstacle for the family, it would quickly be 
overburdened with requests for review, creating a need to decide 
faster, either by shorter deliberation or with added personnel. This 
solution is neither good for prospective parents nor for society. 
Shorter deliberations risk the merits of the process, while added 
board members add resources and risks contradicting results for 
similar cases. 
The second reason that a case-by-case review process is not a 
useful regulatory process is that in large numbers, such process 
eventually becomes policy-making. It is inevitable that 
technological advancement and societal values will allow for more 
and more opportunities regarding parental selection. Thus, if the 
whole point of a case-by-case review process is to attend to the 
needs of specific families, it is inevitable that families’ concerns 
would be categorized and regarded considering previous decisions 
of the board. This is not only due to efficiency concerns and the need 
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to process many requests in a timely manner, but also due to the 
sense of equal treatment that public servants are obliged to. 
Despite the regulatory deficiency of such method, it has an 
advantage that legal regulation misses. The tendency to respect and 
to obey professional authority in private matters, such as doctors and 
other professionals, is commonly greater than legal obedience.126 A 
professional advisory board, even if it applies policy based on 
ethical and societal values, is likely to be trusted publicly more than 
legislative policy dictating family values. Another advantage of 
professional advisory board is the updated information that may be 
applied to the decision. Whereas legislature is stagnant in nature, in 
a realm of rapid advancements, many legislative regulations become 
dated and even obsolete, in light of technological advancements. A 
board of professionals is able not only to be more flexible than a 
legislator but also to apply state-of-the-art knowledge in the 
deliberations. 
 
V. SUMMARY 
 
Becoming a parent is a life-changing event. It is only natural 
that people put extreme emphasis on decisions regarding their 
parentage. It is also commonly accepted that parentage is not a 
necessity, but a privilege for those who want it. Therefore, we view 
it acceptable to place conditions over this pivotal experience. Not 
everyone is obliged to be a parent and parenting is not mandatory 
under any circumstances. Indeed, both law and society allow 
individuals to condition the decision to parent. 
It is, however, questionable what conditions are placed on 
parentage. All prospective parents wish for a healthy offspring with 
maximum potential to succeed in life. But are all preferences 
legitimate? When past regimes took advantage of scientific 
advancements to control breeding, this led to horrific acts. Eugenics 
became a foul concept. The justified aim of the eugenic movement–
to better human life and minimize pain suffering-took a sickening 
turn into complete erasure of personal autonomy. 
With careful avoidance of using the term eugenics, the idea of 
parental selection and controlled breeding advanced rapidly. This 
advancement was not only scientific, but also legal and societal. In 
this paper, we demonstrated legally and socially acceptable methods 
                                                                                                                                        
126See generally Eric J. Cassell, Consent or Obedience? Power and Authority in 
Medicine, 352(4) N. ENGL. J. MED. 328 (2005). 
50 CHILD AND FAMILY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:19 
for parental selection: in adoption processes, in abortion regulation, 
and in PGD procedures. Eugenics, the improvement of breeding, is 
a modern fact of life. Conditioning parentage on the existence of 
specific traits of the prospective child (positive eugenics) and 
conditioning parentage on the absence of a specific trait of the 
prospective child (negative eugenics) is recognized by legal systems 
and by public values. 
We are fully aware of the perils of this phenomenon. It is 
impossible to forget the detrimental results of past interventions in 
parentage decisions. Alas, the use of eugenic rhetoric in the past was 
a means by regimes to restrict personal autonomy and apply 
paternalistic values. Conditional parentage in current times is the 
exact opposite. It is a means for individuals to exercise private rights 
and make autonomous decisions about their parentage. States’ 
paternalistic interventions in these conditions, where there are such 
interventions, are made to restrict individuals from applying eugenic 
practices in the private realm; they are intended to restrict parental 
choice rather than coerce one. 
The difference between past paternalistic intervention in 
parental selection and current paternalistic restrictions does not 
make such regulation redundant. We acknowledge the need for 
oversight in the conditions–positive or negative–that individuals 
place on parentage. Although such conditions may contribute to the 
well-being of the family and society at large, they may also harm it. 
These conditions may quickly slip into a dystopian reality of tailor-
made, homogenic, commodified society, with all respective horrors 
of the past. 
We urge in this paper, to not only acknowledge and accept 
eugenic as a current reality of parentage, but we also argue for its 
regulation. In this paper we highlighted four methods of regulation 
that we recognize in parental selection practices. We evaluate the 
benefits and challenges of each method but dare not rate them. 
Instead, we call for an open discussion, without the pretense that 
eugenics are banned or outcasted, on the regulatory processes that 
are required to protect society and its individuals from abuse of 
scientific advancements. 
 
